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The Tiananmen Protestors, Then and Now
April 26, 2009 in A Year of Anniversaries by The China Beat | No comments

China Beat sent out a note to a few scholars and journalists who have carefully watched and written
about the events of 1989, asking them to send in short commentaries detailing what they wish more
people knew, associated with, or remembered about that spring. We ran the first piece in this limited
series, by John Gittings, last week. This is the second piece.
Jonathan Unger is a Professor at Australia National University, the former editor of the China
Journal, a co-author of Chen Village, and editor or co-editor of many books, including The Prodemocracy Protests in China: Reports from the Provinces.
By Jonathan Unger
Looking back in time from a distance of two decades, we are apt to forget the economic circumstances
in which the nationwide protests of 1989 arose, as well as the vantage points of the protests’
participants.
In the late 1980s, people across China felt frustrated and angered by inflation and mounting
corruption. This dissatisfaction had been moving toward a crisis point over the previous couple of
years despite the fact that urban living standards, on the whole, had been rising steadily throughout
most of the Eighties. But expectations of a better life had been rising even faster, and when inflation
in 1988 began to overtake wage rises in the state sector, frustrations sharpened. Workers who had
been willing to countenance the corruption of officials when their own wage packets were growing
healthily became resentful in 1988 and 1999 when they saw that the close kin of officials were cutting
themselves an undue share of the pie while their own slices shrank.
What held the protesters together was the very fact that theirs was a protestmovement, without a
clear platform. Had there been one, far fewer people might have participated – for the solutions to
China’s economic ailments favored by different groups among the protesters were very much at
variance. Some of the protesters who came into the streets – in particular the leading intellectuals and
most of the students – wanted the economic reforms to proceed faster. Others among the protesters
contrarily had discovered that the economic reforms had not been to their advantage: particularly
those in the working class whose incomes were declining, and those whose jobs were no longer secure
or who had already been laid off. Only a fragile unity was pasted together among these groups. The
better educated had little sympathy for the circumstances of the laborers, and for much of the time
the university students sought to keep the working class at arms’ length, preventing workers from
entering the perimeters of their own demonstrations.
All the same, more than merely anger at economic woes and corruption held the various protesters on
the same side of the political divide. They did project a vague common vision of what they wanted,
and it was summed up in the word “Democracy.” The word was blazoned on a multitude of their
banners. But by “democracy,” few of the protesters meant one person, one vote. Most of the
university students and intellectuals had no desire to see the nation’s leadership determined by the
peasants, who comprised a majority of the population. Many urban residents held the rural populace
in disdain, and their fear was that the peasants would be swayed by demagogues and vote-buying.
Some of the protesters were nonetheless vaguely pro-democratic just so long as democracy could be
put off to a future time. The then-Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang favored a policy called “neoauthoritarianism,” under which the Party would act as a benevolent autocracy until such time as the
middle class had developed sufficiently to predominate in a very gradually democratized polity. Until
then, China would remain in a state of tutelage, much as Sun Yat-sen had proposed in the 1920s. This
was the program of the Party’s reform camp, and it drew support from among the urban educated
elite.
If not immediate political democracy in the shape of multiparty elections for the nation’s leaders, what
some of the educated protesters in Tiananmen Square wanted, rather, was an independent press that

could play a watch-dog role over the political leadership. They wanted access to more interesting
magazines and films. They also wanted what they considered a more fair distribution of incomes, in
which they would be beneficiaries. They wanted academic freedom, and the ability to safely advise
and constructively criticize the government.
But their use of the word “Democracy” also represented more than that, and its mass appeal lay in
this additional dimension. Above all, the great bulk of the participants in the protests wanted freedom
from the petty constraints imposed upon them at their place of work or school. For decades, access to
travel tickets, entertainment, accommodation, medical care – a vast range of advantages and
sanctions large and small – had been controlled by work-unit bureaucrats, who dispensed favors to
those who kept their noses clean or, worse yet, to those who obediently kowtowed to these Party
hacks. People wanted out from under these stifling controls.
Everywhere across China, they named their new student groups AutonomousStudent Associations (in
China, literally Student Self-ruling [zizhi] Associations). So too, the organizations that the intellectuals
established almost invariably were titled Autonomous associations. The workers’ groups were
titled AutonomousWorkers’ Leagues. The key demand quickly became that the government recognize
their organizations, and not exact retribution for having established them. What the urban populace of
China was demanding, in short, was no less and no more than “civil society” – an intermediary sphere
between state and society that is not controlled by the state and that creates a ‘space’ between the
polity and the populace. In China, even innocuous independent organizations had not been allowed.
For the previous forty years all “mass organizations” were creatures of the party-government. What
the populace essentially demanded was simply an opportunity to relate to each other without
interference or oversight. It was for this reason that this word Autonomous held importance to them.
It was precisely these demands, harmless though they might appear, that seem to have frightened
the old men of Zhongnanhai, China’s Kremlin. It is likely that the crisis could have been brought
peacefully to a close had they formally recognized the new organizations’ right to exist. But from
beginning to end, China’s leaders felt they needed steadfastly to refuse that recognition. Their whole
conception of the reformed Leninist state was at stake. Earlier in the Eighties, they had already bent
enough to allow advisory forums containing “leading personages” to be formed. But even if some
semi-autonomous forums were to exist in the new China, they, the Party leaders, would initiate them.
First the students and then quickly other social groups were taking that initiative out of the Party’s
hands, were grabbing the nettle for themselves. It signaled to the aged Party leaders a dangerous
political environment in which people not only were shaping their own operational sphere but, worse
yet, might well wish to use that new-found ground in future to play an active role in the political
arena. In fact, they were in the midst of doing so in Tiananmen Square. This went against everything
that the Party leaders were accustomed to or believed in – which is that the Communist Party is
uniquely positioned to steer China into a better future, without interference. They were not willing to
see the Leninist polity, theirpolity, successfully challenged and weakened.
Out in the Square, meanwhile, a new rights consciousness was quickly emerging, but it was still a
crudely formed consciousness. As noted, the protesters who had joined one or another of the new
jerry-built associations had been acting on an emotional feeling about what they were against –
irritated by corruption and the difficulties in the economy and tired of the Party’s control over so many
aspects of their lives. But very few of the activists and protest leaders held any real notion of what
type of political structure might conceivably take the place of the strong-handed Party machine. Very
few, even among the intellectuals, had any coherent political program to offer – just very vaguely
worded demands for a liberalization and relaxation of the system. It was a movement of protest that
was groping blindly in the dark.
Then and Now
If anything, many of the protesters at Tiananmen were more in favor of political liberalization than
they are now. At the time, they admired Mikhail Gorbachev and the political reforms he was carrying
out. But the collapse and dismemberment of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the corruption
and plunging living standards that soon followed under Boris Yeltsin’s rule soured China’s educated on
the idea of Party-led political liberalization along Gorbachev’s lines. By the mid-1990s, young Russian
women were flowing into China to work as prostitutes. Chinese considered this shocking evidence of

Russia’s penury and humiliation. Many of the urban educated who had demonstrated in 1989 began to
feel relieved that China had followed Deng Xiaoping’s policy of economic rather than political reform.
Nevertheless, many of them today still think of themselves as pro-reform, albeit in modest ways. They
are apt to shake their heads in dismay at China’s environmental problems and express hopes that the
government will give greater priority to the issue. Those with expertise are often eager to offer up
suggestions on how to enact this or that small, incremental reform. What pass in China for academic
papers are often really policy prescriptions on how to improve one or another aspect of China’s
physical or administrative infrastructure, or relieve traffic congestion, or provide for a more effective
education curriculum.
Generally, the urban educated today have what they wanted at the time of the Tiananmen protests.
They feel they can make such recommendations and that their expertise is respected. They and their
children also now have their personal space, in the shape of access to websites, chat rooms, and a
wide variety of publications and films. They can say what they want so long as they stay within
increasingly generous boundaries and do not challenge the Party’s political monopoly.
Above all, in their material livelihoods the urban educated are doing very well, whereas at the time of
the Tiananmen protests in 1989, they had good reason to be angry. Their salaries were low, and sour
jokes circulated about private barbers earning more with their razors than hospital surgeons with their
scalpels. But in the years since, there has been a deliberate government policy to favor the welleducated. Year after year the professionals on government payrolls have been offered repeatedly
higher salaries. During one year in the late 1990s, the pay of all of the academics at China’s most
prestigious public universities was literally doubled in one go. Opportunities to earn high salaries
opened up just as much in the private sector. Many of the university students at Tiananmen Square in
1989 now drive cars and live in fancy high-rise apartments. They have gained a lifestyle that they had
never imagined possible, and they do not want to upset the apple cart. If the government’s plan was
to co-opt the salaried middle class, it has worked.
Reflecting on the Tiananmen protests, one of the most famous of the student leaders, Wuer Kaixi,
flippantly articulated their desires, “So what do we want? Nike shoes. Lots of free time to take our
girlfriends to a bar. The freedom to discuss an issue with someone. And to get a little respect from
society.” They now have all that, in spades.
As a result, the members of the educated middle class, including many of the former university
students who crowded Tiananmen Square two decades ago, have become a bulwark of the current
regime. Summarizing a large survey of political attitudes in Beijing, a recent book concludes that,
among all urban groups, “those who perceive themselves to belong to the middle class and who are
government bureaucrats are more likely to support the incumbent authorities.” If there is another
outbreak like Tiananmen, in fact, many of them might prefer to be on the government side of the
barricades.
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